This article analyses the linguistic and discursive elements which contribute to the production of implicit homophobia. Strategies for countering homophobic language have been developed. However, our interest here is in documenting implicit homophobia, where homophobic beliefs are only hinted at, are disassociated from the speaker, or are embedded within discursive and argument structures. We analyse the debate around the introduction of same-sex marriage legislation in the UK. We focus on a series of programmes on BBC Radio 4, The Moral Maze, where the issue of same-sex marriage was debated with a team of panelists and invited guests. Different perspectives on same-sex marriage were discussed, in a seemingly objective way, where the interactants distanced themselves from homophobic beliefs. We focus on stance, recontextualisation, imaginaries, and metaphor to make implicit homophobia visible. Thus, we develop a linguistic and discursive `toolkit' which will enable implicit homophobia to be challenged and countered.
Introduction: 2
The aim of this paper is to map out at a discourse level what implicit homophobia consists of. Explicit homophobia, just like explicit sexism or racism, is relatively easy to identify, though still difficult to combat (Butler, 1997; Mills, 2008 . However, implicit homophobia, where speakers hint at or presuppose homophobic beliefs whilst also claiming that they are not homophobic, is much more difficult to identity. The focus of this paper, therefore, is to provide a linguistic, discourselevel toolkit for identifying implicit homophobia. In this paper, we consider the debates about the legislation on equal marriage that have taken place in the UK; as a result, the homophobic beliefs that we identify here are specific to that context. We hope, however, that this discussion will also provide a framework for future analyses of implicit homophobia in other contexts. It is not always clear when something is implicitly homophobic. Indeed, when investiging these debates, we were initially loath to categorise the beliefs expressed around samesex marriage in this way. By providing a framework, however, we hope to enable others to identify homophobia in its less obvious forms. This is not prescriptive; it is an illustration of what can be uncovered when a focus on linguistic elements is integrated with a focus on the discourse level.
By linguistic elements, we refer to features such as nouns, passivisation, tense, deixis, and so on. In much critical discourse analysis (CDA) work, it has been assumed that this should be the focus of analysis (Fairclough, 1989; Jeffries, 2010 . However, more recent CDA work has insisted that we focus instead on elements at a higher discourse level, above the level of the sentence and at the level of argument structure (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012) . We argue that it is only through integrating linguistic with discourse level elements that we are able to adequately analyse texts. We examine a range of linguistic and discourse level elements in this 2 We worked collaboratively on the writing of this project by using the documents facility on Google Drive. context of the Moral Maze debates, these make up the argumentation structure. By 'argumentation structure', we mean the complex ways in which a text tries to persuade the reader of a particular argument or position. This is understood by Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 36) as 'a social and rational activity of attempting to justify or refute a certain claim, and aiming to persuade an interlocutor (a reasonable critic) of the acceptability (or unacceptability) of a claim', achieved dialogically through the presentation of rational and logical reasoning. Thus, in this article, we uncover the arguments used in The Moral Maze which we consider to be implicitly homophobic.
Our overall aim is to describe the way that, within this debate on the Moral Maze, the arguments about equal marriage are framed within a religious and biologistic/'natural' framework which poses heterosexual marriage as the norm and which implicitly categorises samesex relationships as abnormal and associated with other stigmatised, nonheteronormative sexualities (such as polyamory, incest and polygamy). In order to set out a framework for talking about equal marriage in positive terms, and not framed solely by religious discourse with its focus on sin, compliance, tradition and aberration, we find that there is a need to frame the discussion of samesex marriage in terms of human rights or sexual freedoms. In this way, we hope to be able to map out alternative conceptions of equal marriage as well as illustrating the arguments against it.
The marriage equality debate in the UK
Samesex couples were unable to have a legallyrecognised union in the UK until 2005, when 'civil partnerships' were introduced by the Labour government. This was brought in as a separate legal union to marriage, (which remained the exclusive right of heterosexual couples) . In 4 September 2011, Liberal Democrat MP Lynne Featherstone, then the Under Secretary for 4 Heterosexual couples are not currently able to choose to have a civil partnership.
Equalities, announced that a government consultation into samesex marriage would be launched in March 2012, consisting of a survey which was available for all citizens to complete.
The survey asked the people of England and Wales' views on whether samesex couples should be able to have a civil marriage rather than a civil partnership, and how this should be implemented. In December 2012, it was announced that 53% of the 228,000 responses agreed that samesex couples should be able to have a civil marriage ceremony (HM Government 2012). One month later, Maria Miller, the Secretary of State (for Culture, Media and Sport) and
Minister for Women and Equalities, introduced the Marriage (SameSex Couples) Bill to Parliament. The Bill proposed the extension of civil marriages to samesex couples, but prevented religious unions for samesex couples or civil partnerships for heterosexual couples.
After lengthy debate in the House of Commons, the Bill was passed by Members of Parliament with 366 votes in favour, and 161 votes against. After moving to the House of Lords, as is British constitutional procedure, the Bill was again debated and passed back to Parliament before being written into law by the Queen in July 2013. The Act came into effect in March 2014.
Throughout this twentytwo month process, the British media broadcast and published debates about whether samesex couples should be allowed to marry. Political parties on the left, such as the Green Party, the Labour Party, the Liberal Democrats and some Conservative party members -including the Prime Minister, David Cameron -were all broadly in favour, as were popular newspapers such as The Times, The Guardian and The Independent . Equally 5 influential newspapers such as the Daily Mail, the Daily Telegraph and The Sunday Times were against it, along with some members of the Conservative party, but most political parties in opposition were minority parties -including the farright British National Party and the United Kingdom Independent Party. A number of media outlets gave highprofile religious leaders a 5 These claims are based on preliminary findings from our analysis of a corpus of UK newspaper articles focusing on samesex marriage (in prep). platform to express their opposition to the plans; this included the former Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Carey, who said in the Daily Mail that 'marriage will only remain the bedrock of a society if it is between a man and a woman' (Carey, 2012) and the country's most senior Catholic, Cardinal Keith O'Brien, who wrote in the Daily Telegraph that the government were indulging in 'madness' and samesex marriage would be a 'grotesque subversion' (O'Brien, 2012) .
The debate continued throughout the entire legislative process and, unusually, was considered three times by the Moral Maze, a weekly current affairs debate show on BBC Radio 4. In the analysis which follows, the discussions taking place in these broadcasts are considered in relation to how discourses of homophobia and equality are constructed and negotiated by the participants. Specifically, the use of stance, imaginaries and metaphor is investigated, in terms of how they enable speakers in the Moral Maze, through discussing heterosexual and homosexual relations within the context of religion, to take implicitly homophobic stances towards or against samesex marriage whilst posing themselves as reasonable, logical and not homophobic.
The Moral Maze
The Moral Maze is a weekly fortyfive minute radio programme, produced by the BBC since 1990 and hosted by Michael Buerk on Radio 4. Each week, Buerk introduces a particular topic which is to be discussed by four members of a panel through the interrogation of a selection of four 'witnesses'. The popular media, including the BBC, routinely referred to the Marriage (SameSex Couples) Bill as 'Gay Marriage'. In this paper, we refer to it instead as 'samesex marriage' or `equal marriage' to allow for the fact that not all people in samesex relationships necessarily identify as gay. 7 Transcripts of each broadcast were created by the Discourses of Marriage Research Group and are extremely irregular for the Moral Maze to revisit a topic, and so three separate broadcasts on this topic signifies its social significance and newsworthiness. 8
The structure of the Moral Maze is consistent from week to week; there is a panel, made up of regular social commentators (including journalists, religious or business leaders, academics and politicians) and a selection of witnesses who are invited because of their relevant specialist experience or knowledge. In the course of the debates on samesex marriage that make up our data, several of the panellists Melanie Phillips (who works for the rightwing Daily Mail newspaper), exConservative MP Michael Portillo and Catholic writer Clifford Longley appear in two broadcasts. Kenan Malik, a science historian and neurobiologist, appears in all three. The witnesses are comprised predominantly of religious leaders and political campaigners, each being interviewed, after being introduced by Beurk and making an opening statement. Buerk then selects two of the panel members to interview the witness individually.
The witness is always the last person to take the floor before their segment ends, and they tend to be given an equal amount of floor time between eight to ten minutes although this does vary a little depending on the flow of discussion. Across the three Moral Maze transcripts considered in this article, there are five witnesses and four panel members who broadly support samesex marriage, with six witnesses and three panel members opposed to it. Figure 1 shows the structure of each of the recordings, detailing which witnesses were interviewed by which panel members. The individuals highlighted in grey are in favour of samesex marriage, whereas those in white took stances against it. The panel members selected to interview each witness are on opposite sides of the debate; no witness is interviewed by a panel member who shares available via our blog, at http://discoursesofmarriage.blogspot.co.uk. 8 MM0 is not analysed in as much detail as the later two programmes as it was largely concerned with the state of heterosexual marriage in the light of the upcoming legislation on samesex marriage. We do, however, refer to this programme when it is of contextual relevance. their stance.
Figure 1: Mapping the Moral Maze
Of particular significance to the current study is what Fairclough and Fairclough (2012: 83) refer to as recontextualisation. This is the process whereby discourses from one context are reappropriated or 'colonised' in another, such as economic discourses like Marxism being taken and used within political or business fields, or management discourse being used within the context of universities. When speakers build arguments they both draw on existing discourses from other contexts and gradually create their own discourses that come to be associated with their argument (Fairclough and Fairclough, 2012: 84) . The process of recontextualisation is 8   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 important to consider when analysing the construction of a line of argumentation such as justifying either a pro or anti samesex marriage stance as, by drawing on recognisable discourses from contexts such as the law courts or scientific research, speakers may index (point to) an authoritative identity or construct an objective stance .
The debates in the Moral Maze are legitimised through the recontextualisation of the social institution of law; the way that the programme is structured colonises discursive structures more typically associated with legal contexts. The format of the show may be compared with the format of a UK Crown Court, with Buerk serving as the judge (an impartial, yet controlling, persona) and the panel members serving as barristers who ask questions of the witnesses (a loaded term) who are called to testify. According to Coulthard and Johnson (2007:96) , there are several fixed elements of a Crown Court trial, including the indictment ("the offence(s) with which the trial is concerned being read out to the court"), the opening address, evidence from prosecution and defence lawyers, the closing summingup and judgement. In the Moral Maze, Buerk begins each broadcast with an overview of the topic at hand, representative of the indictment and a judge's opening address. He then introduces each of the panel members in turn, allowing them a brief opening statement in much the same way that both prosecution and defence barristers are given the floor to summarise their position. Witnesses are then called, albeit by the host rather than the panel members themselves, and are (cross) examined by two panel members.
The recontextualisation of legal discourse in the Moral Maze allows the 'witnesses' to be seen as legitimate and authorised to speak on the topic of discussion. Coulthard and Johnson note that 'Not all witnesses are equal', claiming that, in court cases, the vast majority of witnesses will be 'lay people', with expert witnesses called upon only when necessary (2007:112) . However, in the case of the Moral Maze, all of the witnesses are arguably experts in their respective fields. 9   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 What is questionable is whether their expert status as, for example, religious leaders, campaigners or psychoanalysts, actually qualifies them as 'experts' on marriage law. Their role as witnesses gives them a presumed authority, yet their views on marriage are necessarily biased. This fuels the debate, of course, but the reasons for them being selected as expert witnesses seem arbitrary or even partisan. The fact that historians on religion and religious leaders have been chosen as experts, for example, leads to the debate being skewed towards the framing of marriage in terms of historical and religious discourse and, because samesex marriage is discussed as an aberration in this context, tends to frame the debates in implicitly homophobic terms. Similarly, we might ask why there are no witnesses who specifically identify as atheist, whilst Rabbis, Quakers, Catholics and Anglicans are asked to contribute. There is also no commentator who happens to be gay but is not specifically involved in LGB (lesbian, gay and bisexual) rights activism. We feel that the casting of the broadcast within such a religious and historical framework ensures that the discussion is led in a particular way; the focus tends towards religion rather than LGBT activism or human rights.
In terms of the recontextualisation of legal proceedings, the host, Michael Buerk, is presented as an impartial judge, and he therefore gives each witness a similar amount of time to speak. However, when he introduces the the topic of discussion in the opening segment of each Moral Maze debate, he does tend to highlight the arguments against samesex marriage rather than those for it. It is the host's remit to introduce each panelist and witness, and also to end the questioning of one panel member and introduce another; in this sense, he has control of the floor at all times. Towards the end of the broadcast, each panel member is invited to comment on what they have heard, parallel to the closing speeches afforded to defence and prosecution barristers in court (although, unlike the monologue of the courtroom, there is some discussion between panel members). The host always gets the final word. He may give an extremely brief 10 summary, similar to a condensed version of a judge's summingup, before ending the broadcast. Whilst there is no jury as such in the Moral Maze, it is arguable that the radio listeners go beyond being passive audience members; they are encouraged to evaluate the arguments of the panel and the witnesses in order to 'sentence' the issue at hand on an individual level.
Our analysis of the three Moral Maze broadcasts considers this recontextualisation of the law courts in the light of the arguments that are presented in relation to samesex marriage. We consider the linguistic strategies underlying these arguments and specifically focus on those which allow speakers to position samesex relationships as unequal to heteronormative ones. In order to identify such implicitly homophobic discourse, we consider the ways in which speakers draw on these heteronormative ideologies, an issue discussed below with reference to research in language and sexuality.
Language and homophobic discourse
As will be shown below, in the Moral Maze broadcasts analysed in this article, the speakers who are against samesex marriage largely draw on heteronormative discourses to justify their stance. Heteronormative discourses are those which position heterosexuality as both natural and normal (Motschenbacher, 2011: 152) and, in turn, render 'all other forms of human sexual expression pathological, deviant, invisible, unintelligible, or written out of existence' (Yep, 2002: 167) . Heteronormativity is, then, a subtle cultural system which serves to maintain a gender and sexual order which is driven by 'oppositesex' attraction; through this system, homophobic discourses are enabled. Homophobia may be defined as an irrational fear directed against samesex identities, desires and practices (Baker and Ellece, 2011: 56) , and there has recently been increasing interest in the language of homophobic discourse within the field of language and sexuality (Leap, 2012: 567 the use of which can have negative outcomes ranging from 'an incitement to vote for a proposition, or to murder or abuse the individual suspected of being gay ' (2010: 325) .
Homophobic discourse is not always realised in the form of hate speech, however. Indeed, as Brickell (2001: 214) has argued, overtly homophobic language which directly positions LGB people as inferior has become somewhat 'frowned upon'. In this article, we are interested in what we refer to as implicit homophobia, focusing upon the linguistic strategies which are used to draw upon heteronormative ideologies which, in turn, allows speakers to position samesex relationships as unequal to heterosexual ones, and at the same time ensures that the speaker cannot be accused of being homophobic. As Morrish (2010) argues, no linguistic features are intrinsically homophobic; it is rather the use of particular terms and argument structures in a given context which may lead to an overarching message of homophobia. As such, a text -or its authors cannot be classified as homophobic based solely on linguistic featurespotting but, instead, 'shared properties of homophobic texts' will be found at the discourse level (Morrish, 2010: 328) . In this sense, homophobia is best seen as occasioned by an amalgamation of discursive and stylistic strategies, rather than as being embedded within a text (Leap, 2004) .
Whilst studies of explicit homophobia may focus, for example, on the use of homophobic epithets such as 'fag' (Pascoe, 2005) , or on the way 'gay' can be used to stigmatise heterosexual males who are perceived as insufficiently 'masculine' (Cameron, 1997) , research investigating how homophobia is hidden within texts relies on layered analysis of texts; from close linguistic analysis to an analysis of broader discursive and sociohistorical levels. Peterson's (2010) research is an example of this; he examines how institutional homophobia is instantiated in texts on the website of a Christian organisation. He focuses on stylistic choices and discursive strategies to uncover how lexical choices, modality, agency, genre appropriation and semantic relationships are used to reinforce supposedly objective evaluations that position Provencher's (2010) study of homophobic language in France focuses on discursive strategies in relation to speaker/listener constructs and social semiotics.
He finds that the discreditation of an openly gay mayor because of his sexuality is possible in France, due to broadly accepted notions of French citizenship and the underlying assumptions about who belongs to the collective social unit (e.g. normative members of society). In the analysis which follows, we take a similar 'layered analysis' approach to uncover the implicit homophobic discourse underlying individuals' stances against marriage equality.
Of particular concern here, of course, is political discourse and debate concerning rights for samesex couples. In Britain today, the use of overtly homophobic or sexist language by those in politics and in the public eye is deemed unacceptable. This was demonstrated in September 2013, when Member of the European Parliament Godfrey Bloom was reprimanded for joking that women in parliament were 'sluts' (Holehouse and Deacon, 2013) . Those individuals opposing legal changes that give LGB people more rights must therefore be careful with their use of language. The study of speeches by politicians and public figures about the equality of gay people is more likely to bring to light examples of implicit rather than explicit homophobia, then.
An example comes from Burridge (2004) , who analysed transcripts from the House of Lords during debates surrounding the repeal of Section 28, a law passed in 1998 to prevent teachers from 'promoting' samesex relationships to children. Burridge shows that those opposed to the repeal of this law did not tend to make overtly homophobic comments, but instead emphasised that 'the rationale for discrimination [was] located in something external to a speaker's attitude to homosexuality' (Burridge, 2004:328) . One particular issue repeated in Burridge's data was the consideration of the rights of children, which framed antirepeal comments in terms of social welfare, as opposed to prejudice against gay people. As will be shown later, this link between homosexuality and child welfare is reiterated in the Moral Maze data, in the repeated use of the 13   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 heteronormative argument that marriage is intrinsically linked to procreation and successful child rearing. Homosexuality is thus characterised as endangering children. Baker (2004) also provides a useful analysis of the language used in debates in the House of Lords between 1998 and 2000, focussing on proposals to lower the age of consent for gay men from 18 to 16. Baker's analysis centres on how discourses of homosexuality are constructed by participants through the investigation of frequent lexical items used by opposing sides. He located a range of implicit homophobic arguments. Those against the proposal to lower the age of consent for gay men drew on discourses of danger, criminality and abnormality. A discourse of 'danger and ruin' was characterised by the belief that anal sex is dangerous (Baker, 2004: 97) , another example was that the reforms represented the 'thin end of the wedge', a metaphor with similar connotations to the 'slippery slope', which features in the Moral Maze data below. Baker shows how the use of phrases like gross indecency and commit imply criminal behaviour, and anal intercourse is thus positioned as aberrant in relation to 'normal intercourse' (2004: 100).
Baker argues that the antireformers are able to present implicit homophobic arguments by only talking about homosexual acts, not gay people, thereby drawing a distinction between behaviour and identity. This disassociation allows the antireformers to justify their opposition in that, if homosexuality is defined as an act, and the prototypical act of homosexuality is anal sex, which is dangerous and criminal, then the age of consent for anal sex should not be lowered. In an  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 God's ideal' by a Church of England priest (ibid.) This resonates with the findings of Baker's (2004) study, in that antireformers focus on sexual behaviour rather than sexual identity.
Baker also shows that those in favour of reform framed the debate in terms of equality and tolerance, a finding which also features in the work of Baunach (2011) . In relation to debates over samesex marriage taking place in the USA, Baunach notes that the 'media frame' of morality (as used predominantly by those who are antisamesex marriage) was contrasted with the equality/tolerance media frame (characteristic of those who were prosamesex marriage).
Rather than focussing on whether an argument is homophobic or not, Baunach's analysis reveals that those in favour of samesex marriage may position the debate as a 'civil rights or acceptance issue' (Baunach, 2011: 3489) . In doing so, they are able to move the debate on from 'right or wrong' questions and towards 'equality' questions.
An important issue in this area of research, however, is the question of visibility: who actually contributes to debates about gay rights in the mainstream media? Moscowitz (2010) highlights this question in her analysis of a corpus of US news bulletins, documenting who was given airtime to talk about/for samesex marriage. Moscowitz found that 'gays and lesbians were not often given a chance to speak in news reports ' (2010: 34) , meaning that those who were to be directly affected by any changes in legislation were not part of the decisionmaking process in primetime public domain. Given the present study, Moscowitz's finding is interesting, because although some contributors in our data selfidentify as married or unmarried by choice, none of the participants explicitly identify as gay (or in samesex relationships) during the radio broadcasts. Furthermore, Moscowitz (2010:27) noted that when covering 'gay issues… gay and lesbian people are typically pitted against opposing 'official' sources from legal, medical, religious and political authorities'. In the Moral Maze data, below, speakers were not asked to identify themselves in terms of their sexual orientation, although (in line with Moscowitz' argument) we 15   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 do see 'experts' from the fields of religion and politics dominating the discussion. In the three Moral Maze transcripts (as shown in Figure 1 ), seven out of a total of twenty participants are primarily labelled as representing a religious/religionbased institution, and five are introduced as being from a political/campaigning background.
In order to reveal implicitly homophobic stances in broadcasts of the Moral Maze, we follow the approaches outlined in this section by identifying the intertextual clues, references and discursive strategies which underpin speakers' opposition to samesex marriage. Provencher (2010: 291) asks how these clues or references may lead to the interpretation of a message as 'invested with homophobic intent'. Whilst we do not feel it is possible to identify the 'intent' of speakers, through the analysis of stances taken, metaphors employed and imaginaries invoked in the participants' speech, we map out more clearly the workings of implicit homophobic discourse.
Analysis
In this section, we examine recontextualisation, stance taking imaginaries and metaphors in turn.
We begin, below, by briefly examining which discourses are being recontextualised, in order to analyse the argumentation strategies and stances which are being indexed when speakers make their claims. For example, if a speaker draws on scientific or religious discourse during a Moral Maze discussion, we describe the ways that they do this in order to make a successful claim and mark out their own position as logical and authoritative. We then move on to consider the use of metaphor and imaginaries, and patterns of stancetaking which are used to in arguments that produce implicit homophobia.
a. Recontextualisation
We discussed above the way that the format of the Moral Maze seemed to have a judicial structure. In addition, the lexical and syntactic choices of the panel members also reflect this 16   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 judicial framing. For example, one witness makes direct reference to a particular law 'It's actually a right laid out in the 1989 Declaration of Rights for the Child' (MM2) -to support their arguments. Additionally, in MM1 we have collocation sets such as 'would you accept that However, recontextualisation in the Moral Maze data goes beyond legal discourse. There is also recontextualisation of terms associated with religion, in particular Christianity. Religion is mentioned to varying degrees as one of the key issues surrounding (opposition to) samesex marriage, but the discussion of religious issues is not in and of itself evidence of 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 recontextualisation. There are some instances, however, where religious terminology and imagery are appropriated into the discourse without overt reference to any religious element of marriage, such as:
(1) …we continually evolve, which is why I believe we've survived for so long because if we'd stayed where we were we'd still be in the desert very thirsty, MM1
(2) I talk about marriage being there to sanctify a relationship, MM1
(3) That was nice to have a convert, isn't it?, MM1
(4) Do you think that people who think that that should be preserved are themselves some kind of bigot?, MM2
(5) And the other nine percent can go to hell, can they?, MM2
(6) In other words, it's a three part bond: mother, father, children, MM2
Can I mention the word sacred union of two people who come together in order to procreate children? MM2
Mentions of Jews in the desert (1), going to hell (5) and a three part bond (6) are examples of the recontextualisation of religious themes in these broadcasts. Furthermore, we can see lexical items with religious connotations, such as sanctify (2), convert (3), bigot (4), and sacred (7) occurring in MM1 and MM2. Thus, although to a much smaller extent than the recontextualisation of the field of law, there is still arguably a link to religious discourse used to legitimise the debates at hand, and these mentions of religion necessarily frame the debate in religious terms.
Finally, scientific lexis is drawn on in the debate, predominantly to support the arguments of those opposed to samesex marriage. Marriage is referred to as 'a natural institution' seven times across MM1 and MM2, whilst the church is characterised as a living being (8 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 is both quantified and dehumanised.
(8) But, the church is an organic thing, the church is a body…, MM1
(9) Well ninetyone percent of gay people say they believe in marriage, MM2
(10) …the outcomes for married people and their children tend to be statistically better,
MM0
(11) Natural parents in a married household, MM2
(12) …a one in two chance of being without one of their natural parents, MM2
(13) It's the condition which links generation of children to their biological parents, MM2
(14) It's always better for the children of biological parents to stay with their biological parents, MM2
(15) The reason we exclude some of those marriages is for a biological reason and marriage is based on biology, MM2
(16) There are some inequalities that are down to biology, MM2
(17) Can you confirm that one man cannot impregnate another man…, MM2
(18) …a situation where people have a natural desire to live together in a marriage but happen to be gay, MM2
The word 'natural' is used interchangeably with the term 'biological' when referring to parents (examples 1114). By definition, 'biological parents' must refer to the two human beings who contributed genetic material for the creation of a child, yet there is no such clearcut definition for the term 'natural parents'. By using the two terms interchangeably, samesex parents, who currently cannot both contribute genetically to their child/children (see example 17), are eliminated from the scope of both 'biological' and 'natural' parents. The logical parallel to this, though not stated explicitly, is that samesex parents must therefore be 'unnatural' as they cannot fulfil this biological criterion. This conceptualisation of parenthood supports the argument 19   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 that those opposing samesex marriage draw upon heteronormative discourses to support their position.
Invoking the concept of nature when discussing the legal rights of gay people is not unique to this dataset; Edwards (2007: 249) summarises van Gend's (2004: 1) argument that 'Nature does not include samesex relationships in its design and no biological imperative therefore exists for sex between women or between men'. Furthermore, these biological differences are explicitly stated as a cause of inequality between gay and straight couples (examples 1516), thus removing any human agency and rejecting arguments about sexualitybased discrimination (see Edwards 2007 for an extended discussion of the links between marriage and biology in samesex marriage debates). However, it is important to note that the link between nature and marriage is not always made in support of those opposing samesex marriage. Example 18
illustrates that the term can also be used in order to legitimise samesex relationships.
Overwhelmingly, the most popular link between science and marriage in the Moral Maze dataset is the repetition of arguments about procreation. The lemma 'procreation' occurs 33 times across MM1 and MM2, with the cluster 'procreation of children' occurring nine times. The repetition of this term, alongside 15 occurrences of 'biology' and 120 occurrences of 'child', highlights the primary argument used by those opposed to samesex marriage: marriage is where procreation should take place. As procreation is not possible (in the strict biological sense noted above) for samesex couples, they therefore cannot be married. We thus see the rejection of samesex marriage based on a supposedly scientific basis, which draws heavily on heteronormative discourses that couples marry so that they can procreate without sin, and that all couples want to have children. Such arguments run throughout MM1 and MM2, despite mentions of both gay and straight couples using IVF or choosing adoption.Throughout the discussions, then, participants build their argument for or against samesex marriage by putting 20 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 forward particular standpoints or views which relate to the morality of samesex relationships generally and the perceived social and biological need for marriage this enables those against samesex marriage to make their stance clear without appearing to be homophobic. In the following section, this is considered in more detail.
b. Stance
As outlined in the analysis so far, we are concerned in this paper to explore the means by which speakers construct an argument for or against samesex marriage, with particular emphasis on the arguments against. A useful way of thinking about this process is to consider what the speakers are doing as stancetaking. A stance is an evaluation, whereby a speaker takes up 'a position with respect to the form or content of one's utterance' (Jaffe 2009: 3) . By considering how speakers take stances, we can see how they build their arguments. By analysing the stances taken by the programmes' participants, we are able to locate key themes which are used in the production of an argument against samesex marriage.
As mentioned above, both panelists and witnesses initially are called upon to state briefly their views on samesex marriage. It is interesting, then, to note that many of the panellists do not use the opportunity to take direct, unambiguous stances; if those against samesex marriage, only Portillo ('I think that the extension to gays…is unnecessary', MM1) and Phillips ('marriage is a unique institution with a unique value to society... [it] consists in the safeguarding of the…next generation [and] can't be applied to others', MM2) do this. Of those in favour, only Taylor ('I don't see that institution being damaged by it being opened up to homosexuals', MM2) and McElvoy (who states that it would be 'profoundly unfair' to exclude gay people from marriage, MM1) take what we might call 'direct' stances statements which clearly reveal their position on the subject of samesex marriage.
In contrast to this, the panel member Malik avoids taking clear stances throughout his turns in 21   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 all three broadcasts, and therefore does not express his opinion particularly clearly. For example, Focusing on the witnesses, we can see that it is during their statements that the most stances are taken. This is because the witnesses are asked to present and defend their opinion, and are often challenged into making a clear stance (e.g. 'I think that….'). In contrast, the panellists rarely have to defend -or even articulate -their own opinions or evaluations. The majority of stances taken by the witnesses against samesex marriage function to define marriage as a heterosexual union, thus falling back on heteronormative ideologies that men and women are funadamentally different yet matching. In MM1, Landrum's stance makes use of the claim that 'marriage is about difference', whilst Ivereigh refers to 'gender complementarity'. In MM2, Blond's stances reveal his position very clearly: 'marriage has two primary goods -the generation of children and it magnificently negotiates the sexual difference'. James continues this theme, again focusing on children, by stating that 'marriage is the way of uniting man and woman to have their own children'.
The repeated use of the construction 'marriage+is' enables these speakers to align 22   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 themselves with heterosexual marriage rather than samesex marriage; they tend not to begin their utterances with 'I think that...', but instead offer repeated definitions which make their stance clear. Despite being a panellist rather than a witness, Phillips also draws on this particular form of argumentation, claiming that 'marriage as an institution is important to society purely because, I would suggest, of its crucial importance in the safeguarding and upbringing of children' (MM2).
Similarly, whilst Ivereigh argues that marriage is 'a fundamentally inclusive institution' (MM1),
Blond argues that it is 'a peculiar heterosexual institution' (MM2 By looking at stancetaking in the Moral Maze broadcasts, an important conclusion may be drawn about the way that an argument against samesex marriage is constructed. By taking a similar stance repeatedly, speakers can build a contextualised subject position for themselves.
In MM1, for example, Landrum repeats the stance that marriage is about difference by stating that it is conjugal, for procreation, a social good and natural; in turn, he constructs the subject position of 'a logical person', which indexes rationality and allows him to present himself as reasonable rather than phobic. In doing so, he is also able to avoid taking an explicit stance or overtly stating his position on homosexuality itself; instead, by constantly defining marriage in a way which precludes samesex couples, he can build an argument that marriage simply cannot 23   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 include two people of the samesex. Such stancetaking enables those against samesex marriage to avoid taking explicitly homophobic stances, as they position the reasons by which they define marriage as unchangeable and, therefore, as out of their hands.
In contrast to this, stances taken which are in favour of samesex marriage in the debates tend to be direct; this highlights the fact that tolerance is more socially acceptable in this debate than homophobia, hence the reason that those taking an antisamesex marriage stance mitigate their stances. The prosamesex marriage stances tend to concern the following themes: samesex couples should have equal access to marriage, marriage is a social good irrespective of sexuality, and what matters is that two people love each other. However, these stances are typically made in response to the constant reproduction of heteronormative marriage discourses put forward by those who reject the argument of equal marriage. For instance, JannerKlausner's pro stances in MM1 include the argument that 'procreation is only part of marriage -it's good for families to have two people who commit to each other' and the stance that 'marriage equality has nothing to do with incest'. Similarly, Samuels in MM2 is forced to argue in favour of samesex marriage by responding to heteronormative discourses concerning marriage and procreation, taking stances such as 'marriage is not the only way to deal with the questions of giving children the upbringing they deserve' and 'there are very many ways to relate to one another and for families to organise themselves in society'. In this sense, all of the pro stances are taken in response to the anti stances, whereas the antimarriage stances seem to hold weight in their own right. This reflects both the setup of the broadcasts, in that those chosen to represent the opposition to samesex marriage focus on moral and religious reasons, and also the broader cultural context whereby heteronormative ideologies are so salient that samesex couples continue to be looked upon as 'other'. In this sense,however, those in favour of samesex marriage are able to construct a convincing argument, but they are 24   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 always 'on the back foot' in that they have to work harder to defend their stance, because it is more likely to be seen as radical (whereas those against samesex marriage have history, tradition and religion on their side).
The nature of the programme, mimicking as it does a legal setting, leads there to be a distinct power disparity between the witnesses and the panel members. This, in turn, leads to an interesting use of stance, whereby those in power (the panel) tactically attribute a stance to the witness they are interrogating, rather than simply asking them their opinion or directly evaluating
something. An example of this comes from MM2, where Portillo attributes a stance to Hunt; she argues that marriage is a good thing, so he claims 'you are saying that the opposites of these things, that noncommitment, sex without love and promiscuous sex are presumably a bad thing'. By imposing a stance upon a witness like this, the panel member gains power over them, as they impose upon them a need to respond and, potentially, save face. This has an impact on how speakers respond to particular propositions, as the position that they are put in by those opposing them is usually designed to weaken their argument by disrupting its direction and making them appear to contradict themselves . An example of this appears in MM1 when 12 McElvoy attributes a stance to Ivereigh: '…assuming that you would accept that [samesex marriage] is a natural desire'. In doing this, McElvoy forces Ivereigh to take a stance for or against the proposition that gay people are as likely as heterosexual people to want to marry, which indirectly indexes broader cultural debates surrounding homosexuality as an inherent condition rather than a lifestyle choice, and stereotypes related to homosexuality and nonmonogamy. In this case, Ivereigh acknowledges that 'gay love is a reality', seemingly weakening his argument against samesex marriage, but goes on to return to his central, heteronormative argument that marriage is 'apt for procreation'. Assigning an explicitly moralistic 12 Similarly, Coupland and Coupland (2009) find that, in the case of doctors and patients, it tends to be the powerful participant in the interaction (the doctor) who attributes stances to the patient. 25   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 stance to another person is a useful tactic, it seems, because it allows the person interrogating them to imply their own moral stance without having to explicitly take it themselves.
Although there are moments when a prosamesex marriage argument is aired, it is nonetheless the case that stances which oppose samesex marriage occur more frequently in these broadcasts, because they rely on discourses of logic which are supported by heteronormative ideologies of gender complementarity and procreation. These powerful discourses are positioned in such a way that those taking prosamesex marriage stances are forced to respond to and challenge them, leading to their claims for equality being discussed and explored to a lesser degree. In this sense, the evaluations on samesex marriage whether for or against tend to be defined by heteronormative ideologies. A key way that this situation emerges is through the construction of the perceived future threat that samesex marriage would bring; as discussed in the following section, if one is to argue that samesex couples should be able to marry, they must first be able to argue against the potentially negative consequences that this could lead to.
c. Imaginaries
In this part of our analysis, we consider the ways in which the participants of the Moral Maze broadcasts construct `imaginaries' in order to argue that a future where samesex marriage is legalised would be a troubled one. Imaginaries are discursive structures that represent hypothetical situations or possible worlds unrealised at the level of discourse (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012 (Fairclough and Fairclough 2012: 103) . According to Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) , imagined concepts potentially have the performing ability to shape institutional reality, 26   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 depending on the number of people sharing the purported vision. Imaginaries do not have the same performative power. However, imaginaries can be a very powerful performative device as well. This is, for example, the case when an imaginary is presented as if it is an imagined concept, or in other words, when a hypothetical situation is described as if it were a clear future reality. Whether the imaginary then, in fact, creates or shapes institutional reality depends on whether the vision is supported, and whether those who support it have the power to declare a certain imaginary as a fact and impose their view of what the world is on others. Thus, although imaginaries do not actually represent a real or future reality, they might be represented by the speaker as if they do, and are therefore a powerful argumentative device. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 These statements differ in the strength of their modal commitment: the speaker's future vision is illustrated by the use of the modal verb will, which is more definitive than the use of would. The speaker's commitment to the future vision he or she presents is also mitigated, at times, by statements indicating that these are the thought processes of the speaker -such as by using 'I think', or by an acknowledgement of the speaker's lack of knowledge towards the truth of such a vision, for example in the case of the use of the phrase 'we don't know' (Landrum MM1).
Although opponents most frequently construct future visions of samesex marriage, proponents also do so. Summerskill, in answer to Portillo's question 'is part of what you're arguing now that you think that if there is gay marriage that will reduce erm homophobia?', (MM1), constructs a positive future imaginary of samesex marriage: 'I think almost certainly it will increase the level to which people are respected (…) in exactly the same way as everyone else' (MM1). Though the use of the future modal 'will' here was initiated by Portillo question, in which the modal verb 'will' was used as well, it is also mitigated by Summerskill as he indicates that these are his own thoughts by stating that he is 'almost certain'. Although samesex marriage is not a realised state of affairs, it is also presented as an actual vision by McElvoy, who states that 'samesex marriage is based on on the same humane desire to be committed to the other person to live in a lovely relationship and to be part of the social fabric which is held together by people behaving responsibly and where possible loyally to each other' (MM1).
In Imaginaries can also be constructed to put forward moral judgements, by constructing a vision of how the world should be, rather than how it is. Phillip Blond creates several visions like this, for example, he states 'churches should be more radical and offer blessings of civilpartnerships' (MM2). In another interesting example, Blond first expresses a belief 'What I believe is, is that we need universals applying to particular groups', and then continues to discuss this belief as a future vision: `What's good for women will be different from what's good for men. There will be a gold standard for the advancement of of women, there will be a different gold standard of what men, or children or anybody else needs'.
By placing this belief in the future, it is 'further removed' from the actual world and the present state of affairs, and therefore is more difficult to counteract. An example of how morals are used to present a future world that will be dangerous or unknown if samesex marriage is legalised occurs in MM1, whereby Portillo represents oppositesex marriage as a 'good thing' (MM1), and 'the best chance for the stable upbringing for children' (MM1). The imaginary of samesex marriage is therefore implicitly constructed as an undesirable goal by Portillo, and he argues explicitly in the next line that samesex marriage 'breaks the link of marriage and procreation' 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 modality.These future realities conceptualise the consequences of the break between marriage and procreation by stating that there 'could be unpredictable' and 'possibly risky results' (MM1).
Portillo presents this possible world as one where other nonnormative relationships may prosper if samesex marriage is legalised; when interrogating JannerKlausner, a rabbi who supports samesex marriage, he asks: 'If a brother and sister come to you wanting to be married, a father and a daughter wanting to be married, a threesome wanting to married, do you have any ethical resting place in denying them from marriage?'. As indicated by Janner
Klausner's response 'Yes, but I'm asking why you're comparing homosexuality to those', the treating of other types of relationships, as if they are unproblematically analogous to homosexuality is implicitly homophobic; it categorises samesex relationships as 'other' and as equal to unions such as incest and polygamy which, currently, are more widely perceived as deviant in British society. It is clear, here, that the 'slippery slope' metaphor is employed by Portillo, here, to put forward a dangerous possible future world, and thus is a central aspect of his argumentation structure.
What the 'slippery slope' metaphor achieves, then, is the argument that granting a social group one particular right will lead to further requests for reforms that will become gradually more 'unreasonable'. Baker (2004) also identified a similar metaphor use in House of Lords debates on proposals to lower the age of consent for gay men (discussed in section 4, above). As Baker notes, the very presence of this discourse suggests inequality between gay and straight people in the eyes of the law (2004: 101).
In MM1, David Landrum, director of public policy for the Evangelical Alliance, also invokes the 'slippery slope' metaphor in order to argue that samesex marriage represents the 'unreasonable' requests that the granting of civil partnerships has led to: 'The slippery slope argument's already been made by dint of the fact that we're here discussing this now, ten years 30   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 after civil partnerships'. However, the 'slippery slope' argument is made most explicitly by Catholic writer Clifford Longley: `We were talking just now about the slippery slope argument erm haven't we just been watching a dramatic demonstration of the truth proof of the slippery slope argument in 2004 2005 2006 when the civil partnership act was going through Parliament it was said time and time again that this was it this is only this is this is what was demanded there is no following consequential demand for gay marriage' (MM1).
Here, Longley refers to the 'demands' of gay people, which, as Baker points out in his study of speeches made in the House of Lords regarding law reform for gay men, usually collocates with words which imply a lack of legal right, such as unlawfully, kidnappers and ransom (2004: 101).
Samesex marriage is therefore framed in terms of an unreasonable request, which may therefore lead to other such 'unreasonable demands'.
The 'slippery slope' metaphor forms part of a metaphor complex (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 97) of 'danger metaphors', which includes a 'can of worms' metaphor (MM1) and a 'later in the queue' metaphor (MM1). A 'slippery slope' can be defined as a proposal or statement that is met with objection because of the possible consequences it might have, not because of the proposal itself per se. In this sense, it is a highly effective vehicle for the construction of possible future imaginaries. What 'slippery slope' metaphors have in common, therefore, is the idea that one turn of events will lead inevitably to other events, the latter of which bear negative consequences. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 The 'can of worms' metaphor has a negative semantic prosody, and is often used to indicate that the resulting outcome of a turn of event would be out of control, leading to further chaos. In MM1, Clifford Longley asks Laura JannerKlausner "is there another demand as it were later in the queue that will come about probably in a couple of years from now?" As with the 'can of worms' metaphor, this 'later in the queue' metaphor is also likely to be interpreted by the listener as connoting negative evaluation, and implies that granting samesex marriage will inevitably lead to other requests for equal rights reform. In David Landrum's quote above, the events Imaginaries can often be hinted at through the use of metaphors. These metaphors are used to argue that the more 'rights' gay people are granted, the more they will 'demand', and that this will also lead to other 'unreasonable demands' from other groups, such as the extension of marriage to polygamists. Whilst those who are in favour of marriage reform frame the changes in terms of an 'extension' of marriage, those opposing it refer to a 'rebranding' of marriage. In this way, the participants do not take an explicit stance either for or against samesex marriage, relying instead on heteronormative ideologies and the circular argument that marriage is the way 32 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 it is because that is how it has always been. At the time of the Moral Maze recordings, samesex marriage in the UK was not a reality, but it was a challenge to the norm.
This section has discussed imaginaries, and danger metaphors, as part of the argumentation structure of implicit homophobia; we will now focus on the importance of metaphors in their own right.
d.Metaphor
We have shown so far how the analysis of imaginaries reveals the ideological basis of stances that are taken by participants in the Moral Maze broadcasts. We have also shown that metaphor plays an important role in the construction of these imaginaries. Metaphors perform other functions as well in this data, however. In this section, we examine the personification of marriage and the use of metaphors of war to argue for and against samesex marriage. This requires us to address two broad types of metaphor: 'figurative' metaphor (such as legalising samesex marriage being a 'slippery slope') and 'conceptual' or 'cognitive' metaphor those which reveal that X is conceptualised in terms of Y (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 5) . For example, in the statement 'she won the argument', the concept of argumentation is lexicalised in terms of a battle, thus revealing the underlying conceptual metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR.
The structural metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR is a wellknown construct for conceptualising verbal behaviour (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980: 15 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 more clerics saying what really motivates is I don't like homosexuals very much...rather than dressing stuff up in theological /folk as the cloak for that' Summerskill therefore frames the church's behaviour towards gay people in terms of a physical attack, emphasising the physical damage caused. He also accuses members of the church of being dishonest here, where their arguments against sexsex marriage, and homosexual identity in general, are conceptualised as a form of disguise to hide homophobic attitudes. We could describe this in terms of a LYING IS A DISGUISE metaphor, which Summerskill uses to imply the corrupt nature of some members of the Catholic church.
Summerskill also describes the more explicitly homophobic language used by some clerics as 'poisonous', again metaphorically implying the negative effects of such language, that can also be seen as forming part of a war metaphor complex.
Personification, a type of ontological conceptual metaphor, is another rhetorical strategy used by participants to argue for the importance of marriage. In the introduction to the Moral Maze, the novel conceptual metaphor MARRIAGE IS A PERSON underpins Buerk's statement that 'the more heterosexuals reject the idea of marriage, the more homosexuals have become well, wedded to it' (MM 1). In this case, the choice of verb 'wedded', which is usually only used in relation to people, treats the concept of 'marriage' as a social actor. The effect of personifying marriage in this way may be that it acquires a greater social importance, because society values people more than concepts. This sense of importance is used by advocates on both sides of the argument for different ends: those against the proposals for samesex marriage personify the concept of marriage in ways that suggest the importance of keeping marriage as it is currently defined. Those in favour of samesex marriage personify marriage in order to argue that marriage is not static, and therefore amenable to change.
In MM2, Phillip Blond asserts the need to 'protect' marriage, which, as well as implying that 34   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 marriage is fragile, also arguably treats marriage as an animate being. Other antisamesex marriage commentators also make use of a 'protection' metaphor to argue for upholding the status quo. David Landrum describes the government's proposed changes to the Marriage Bill as 'trying to tinker' with marriage (MM1); the choice of verb arguably frames government reform in terms of attempts to 'fix' marriage, given that the word 'tinker' usually collocates with a discourse of mechanics,and occasionally indexes a sense of ineptness, the implication here being that samesex marriage represents the government as novices who are 'playing' with the very idea of marriage. The idea of 'tinkering' with marriage is also alluded to by Austen Ivereigh from Catholic Voices: 'politicians are overstepping the mark by trying to tinker with this fundamental social good' (MM1). It is also interesting that in both cases, the verb 'trying' implies that these attempts have been or will be unsuccessful. Ivereigh also combines the 'tinkering' metaphor with the 'slippery slope' argument discussed above, when he states that 'to tinker [with marriage] would bring such profound consequences, one consequence there would no longer be a mechanism by which the state could promote that in particular which is best for children for families and for society' (MM1). Here the epistemic modal verb 'would' indexes the certainty of a future in which children are raised by samesex spouses, which is evaluated as negative, given that the adjective 'profound' usually cooccurs with negative circumstances.
Marriage is furthermore often treated by participants as a tangible object. This is evident in the exchange below. The verbs 'touched' and 'held' usually cooccur with animate subjects, but here they are being used in direct relation to marriage:
DL [Marriage is] actually something that shouldn't be, touched by politics beyond it sort of being held in custody, held in eh::
AM aspic 35   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 DL aspic by politics, very good, thank you.
Again personifying marriage has the effect of highlighting its importance, therefore implying that to change it has negative effects. In this case, the metaphorical use of 'held in custody' also constitutes a recontextualisation from legal discourse, which may result in the listener accessing schematic associations of the phrase with criminality. Arguably, the consequence of this is that it implies that changes to the status quo are being compared with criminal activity.
Clifford Longley, questioning Rabbi Laura JannerKlausner uses the idiomatic phrase 'playing fast and loose', which ordinarily would be used with tangible objects, to imply that the proposals for equal marriage constitute a careless act:` OK now religions, even liberal ones like yours draw very their very life blood do they not from ancient tradition...isn't it, highly paradoxical therefore to be playing fast and loose with such an ancient tradition as marriage?' Clifford Longley's argument here is that because marriage is an 'ancient tradition', and religions are founded on ancient traditions, religious marriage should not be tampered with. The listener may well infer from the 'fast and loose' metaphor that marriage is fragile, since things that are ancient are often breakable; the implication is that 'playing fast and loose' will have a negative effect on marriage. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 and to exclude homosexuals from it just strikes me as profoundly unfair and actually rather unchristian'. (MM1)
In both these examples, marriage is defined in terms of a bonding mechanism. This contributes to the participants' proargument that marriage is important and therefore both heterosexual and samesex couples should have access to it. McElvoy's recontextualisation of religious discourse is in response to the religious argument that marriage is a religious institution that can only take place between a man and a woman.
As the discussion above shows, metaphors which personify marriage serve to highlight the perceived importance of marriage, which is used to construct arguments for maintaining the (heteronormative) status quo. Metaphors which conceptualise marriage as a 'natural' institution are also used to argue for restricting marriage to heterosexual couples on the basis that it lies outside of human interference. Again, we assert that this is implicitly homophobic because it excludes samesex couples from having equal rights to heterosexual couples.
By contrast, metaphors are also used by those in favour of samesex marriage. Indeed, whilst participants against marriage reform use the 'slippery slope' metaphor to warn of the inevitability of further demands for equality, participants in favour of marriage reform make reference to the 'slippery slope' in order to undermine it. In the following example from MM1, Rabbi Laura JannerKlausner uses the 'slippery slope' metaphor in opposition to a 'mountain' metaphor, to characterise the two arguments in relation to samesex marriage: 'I love the image of a slippery slope, 'cause I just I just don't agree with it, I see a mountain that we are walking up, people walking together, walking towards progress'. Both metaphors are underpinned by the conceptual metaphor CONCEPTS ARE OBJECTS OF NATURE. The 'mountain' metaphor is underpinned by the conceptual metaphors EQUALITY IS A JOURNEY and CONCEPTS ARE OBJECTS.
These metaphors have distinctly different connotations: the notion of a 'slippery slope' usually 37 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 collocates with negatively evaluated concepts, whereas 'mountain', when used metaphorically, is usually used with reference to obstacles to be overcome, which is therefore intended as a positive achievement.
Other same sex marriage supporters use metaphors that are underpinned by the EQUALITY IS A JOURNEY metaphor: Ruth Hunt, director for public affairs for Stonewall, describes the vote passed in the House of Commons as 'the first hurdle', which also treats the campaign for equal rights as a series of obstacles to be overcome; the deictic orientational metaphor 'we're not there yet' conceptualises the legalisation of samesex marriage as a location (MM2). It also links with the journey to equality metaphor, noted above. Ruth Hunt utilises a PROGRESS IS FORWARD orientational metaphor when she states that "Civil Partnerships were incredibly important as a step forward," which also forms part of the EQUALITY IS A JOURNEY complex.
In this section we have seen how the personification of marriage is used by both sides of the debate to argue for the importance of marriage, for different ends. Participants in favour of the changes emphasise the binding function of marriage, and the imposition on marriage which a 'restrictive' heterosexual definition of marriage entails; those against assert that 'tinkering' with marriage will have dire consequences.
Discussion: Argumentation Structure
We have endeavoured to show, throughout the analyses presented so far, that the participants against samesex marriage in the Moral Maze broadcasts rely largely on heteronormative discourses. They position heterosexual marriage as morally, socially and biologically logical and important. In turn, samesex marriage is positioned as oppositional to this and, therefore, as fundamentally problematic. The varied ways in which these speakers build their argument have been shown in relation to stance, metaphor, imaginaries and recontextualisation; whilst each of these issues have so far been considered in turn, we would like to use this penultimate section 38   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64 to show how the combination of these linguistic elements combined leads to an implicitly homophobic argumentation structure. We have considered each of the elements of argumentation structure individually; in this section, we bring them together in our final analysis. 3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 politicians should not try to alter the tradition of oppositesex marriage. Treating marriage as a living organism allows Landrum to make an analogy between changing the structure of marriage and morally contentious alterations in living beings, for example, genetic modification, implying by extension that samesex marriage is immoral. In turn, this allows him to construct a dangerous imaginary, albeit one which is very certain; there is no scope here to suggest that a change of DNA would be a positive thing. As well as arguing that marriage will change, he goes on to suggest that 'it would change all sorts of definitions at the centre of our society' (MM1). As discussed in the section on 'imaginaries', by constructing a negative future imaginary like this about marriage (when including samesex marriage), it is 'further removed' from the actual world and present state of affairs, and therefore more difficult to counteract. This also again links to the 'slippery slope' metaphor, in this case where one negative imaginary would lead to many more negative imaginaries. There is no option, when employing this metaphor, to argue for a positive outcome. As discussed above, positive outcomes are generally referred to with metaphors related to obstacles or journeys events where humans can have a level of control over how they proceed whereas a slippery slope suggests a lack of control, which, in and of itself is negative. It is exactly those kind of negative stance constructions that allow opponents in the Moral Maze debates to construct future visions of samesex marriage as dangerous and immoral, and thus nonnormative.
Through the use of recontextualised scientific discourse, metaphor and the construction of an imaginary world, Landrum's stancework in this moment once again allows samesex marriage to be presented as a threat to society. It clearly positions samesex relationships as other, and as inferior to oppositesex ones. We therefore argue that stances such as this are implicitly homophobic.
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Conclusions
Throughout this article, we have come to a number of conclusions about the way that implicit homophobia works and how it can be analysed and countered. a) What we have discovered about implicit homophobia in this context:
The repeated taking of stances which position samesex marriage as threatening, unnatural or illogical allow an antisamesex marriage discourse to be produced, which at the same time not characterising the speaker as holding homophobic beliefs.. In this sense, because the discourse is recontextualised as scientific and legalistic, none of the faceloss normally associated with openly explicitly homophobic statements is presented. Indeed, explicit homophobia is rejected, Instead, the participants present themselves as logical and authoritative, through alluding implicitly rather than explicitly to homophobic beliefs. Those who are arguing for samesex marriage are put in a reactive position, constantly having to argue against these seemingly objective assertions, and thus always being caught on the backfoot. This homophobia thus has to be interpreted by the listener, rather than simply asserted explicitly by the speaker.
These participants do not present themselves as being homophobic, and therefore save their face, yet are essentially putting forward the argument that samesex marriage could lead to the end of western civilisation. They use imaginaries and danger metaphors to imply that disaster will arise if same sex marriage becomes legal, fundamentally affecting and undermining heterosexual marriage and civilisation as a whole. This demonstrates that they are implicitly drawing on heteronormative ideologies where they position samesex couples as deviant. 41   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 Therefore, even though it is implicit, they are putting forward homophobic positions as seemingly 'logical' and 'reasonable' arguments.
b) Implications for the analysis of homophobia:
It is important when analysing homophobia from a linguistic perspective to analyse both explicit and implicit homophobia. Implicit homophobia often goes unnoticed, in much the same way as early debates around sexism were largely focused on explicit, 'overt' sexism. We have shown, for example, that the use of metaphor enables implicit, undertheradar homophobia whereby speakers do not have to directly or overtly express their beliefs; by presenting marriage as a concrete object, one which cannot be 'tinkered' with, it is possible to convincingly argue that it must not be changed. By using CDA in our approach to the analysis of argumentation structure, it has been possible for us to focus on linguistic elements, such as conceptual metaphor, that might otherwise go unnoticed. Homophobia is clearly far more than the analysis of statements, such as 'I hate gays'. It is wellrooted in this discussion of samesex relationships and marriage.
As it is more difficult to challenge, implicit homophobia is a more robust barrier for equal rights campaigners than explicit homophobia, which is now generally received negatively in wider social discourse.
Although most of the research work of the Discourses of Marriage group is concerned with the analysis of implicit homophobia in relation to these debates about samesex marriage, it is also for us essential, based on this critique of homophobia, to try to develop ways of both challenging these ideas and also discussing marriage in more productive ways. If the argument in favour of samesex marriage is framed only within religious contexts, we are limited in terms of the range of the arguments that can be used. Our arguments will remain caught up in discussions of the 'natural' and the 'traditional'. However, there are clearly more ways of talking about prosamesex marriage, for example in terms of more general discussions of human 42   1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60  61  62  63  64  65 rights and freedom around issues of sexuality.
c) How to counter these homophobic discourses:
We need to ask how these discourses can be challenged, and of what use is a study like this to the broader social movement. In a sense, in engaging with discussions like this, we need to bring about a wider reframing of the debate, by discussing samesex marriage outside the field of religious discourse. We need to consider to what extent these strategies discussed here are homophobic. We are not claiming that the presence of the strategies is essentially and in itself homophobic, but rather that given the particular discursive context, in this case religious, scientific and legalistic recontextualisations, such statements have the potential to serve as, and be understood as, discriminatory. Linguistic features and strategies are multifunctional: a particular metaphor that is used is not homophobic in itself, unless it is used within a particular context. Thus, an analysis which focuses on both the discourse level along with the linguistic level is able to focus on the way that implicit homophobia is about an interplay between contextual features and linguistics items.
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